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A MATCH MADE IN ANTITRUST HEAVEN?           
A LIBERALISTIC EXPLORATION OF THE 
MEDICAL MATCH’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 
MELISSA MAYEUX* 
ABSTRACT 
In the 2004 case Jung v. Association of American Medical Colleges, a 
group of resident physicians brought a class action suit challenging the 
legality of the National Residency Matching Program, a system that 
controls essentially all appointments to medical residency programs. The 
plaintiffs claimed the Match artificially depressed wages and created an 
anticompetitive labor market. The lawsuit was met with a swift end by the 
codification of an antitrust exemption to the Match. Although the Jung case 
is over, medical residents continue to face unreasonable restraints on their 
liberty. This note begins with an overview of medical education and the 
residency match process and details the Jung litigation and resulting 
antitrust exemption. Then, the focus shifts to a philosophical exploration of 
classic ideas of liberty and how the Match contradicts theories of classical 
liberalism and economics. Finally, the note concludes with proposed 
alternatives and modifications that can be implemented to improve the 
Match process and working conditions of medical residents.  
INTRODUCTION 
After completing four years of medical school, newly graduated 
physicians must undergo additional training by completing a residency 
program.1 Residency programs can last between three and seven years, 
depending on the medical specialty.2 Successful completion of a residency 
program and passage of all associated board exams are prerequisites to 
becoming a licensed physician in the United States.3 The recruitment and 
hiring process for first year residents is unlike traditional labor markets. 
There is no negotiation or bargaining aspect because a tightly regulated 
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1. See, e.g., Kristin Madison, The Residency Match: Competitive Restraints in an Imperfect 
World, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 759, 767–68 (2005). 
2. See, e.g, Length of Residencies, WASH. UNIV. SCH. MED., 
https://residency.wustl.edu/residencies/length-of-residencies/ [https://perma.cc/REF2-F5EX].  
3. See Madison, supra note 1, at 767–68. 











system known as the National Residency Matching Program, or “the 
Match,” controls essentially all appointments to residency programs.4  
The Match was implemented in 1952 to streamline the hiring process, 
which had become progressively more chaotic throughout the early 1900s.5 
Because hospitals wanted to avoid the risk of not meeting future staffing 
demands and wanted to secure the most competitive applicants, medical 
students were being pressured to accept job offers at earlier and earlier 
points in their education.6 Binding contracts were often entered into before 
either party had enough knowledge to make an educated decision.7 The 
Match offered the convenient solution of a centralized matchmaking service 
capable of determining the best match between employer and employee 
based on preferential rankings provided by both parties.8 
Though successful at streamlining the process, the Match has serious 
drawbacks. Except in very rare circumstances, participation in the system is 
mandatory.9 Both hospitals wishing to hire new residents and new residents 
wishing to be hired are obligated to participate in the Match in order to 
maintain accreditation within the United States.10 Participation in the 
program creates an irrevocable, binding commitment for both parties.11 
There can be no outside negotiation between the parties and all matches 
produced by the computerized algorithm are final.12 The Match has stripped 
medical residents of any semblance of bargaining power and has thus 
artificially depressed wages and created an environment that fosters harsh, 
oftentimes unsafe, working conditions.13  
A group of resident physicians challenged the legality of the match in 
the 2004 case, Jung v. Association of American Medical Colleges.14 The 
suit, filed on behalf of all resident physicians and directed at a number of 
 
 
4. Id. at 768–69. 
5. See, e.g., Alvin E. Roth, The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match, 289 
JAMA 909 (2003) [hereinafter Origins]. 
6. Id. at 909. 
7. Id. at 910. 
8. Id. at 910–11.  
9. See, e.g., Frances H. Miller & Thomas L. Greaney, The National Resident Matching 
Program and Antitrust Law, 289 JAMA 913 (2003). 
10. Id. at 914. 
11. Robert N. Wilkey, The Non-Negotiable Employment Contract—Diagnosing the 
Employment Rights of Medical Residents, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 705, 715–16 (2011). 
12. Id. 
13. See, e.g., Laura K. Barger, Najib T. Ayas, Brian E. Cade, John W. Cronin, Bernard Rosner, 
Frank E. Speizer & Charles A. Czeisler, Impact of Extended-Duration Shifts on Medical Errors, Adverse 
Events, and Attentional Failures, PLOS MED. (Dec. 12, 2006), 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0030487 [https://perma.cc/PYC3-F58F]. 












named teaching hospitals and medical organizations,15 alleged collusion 
among the defendants to artificially depress wages and create an 
anticompetitive market in violation of federal antitrust laws. The lawsuit, 
despite its merit and early success in court, met a swift end in 2004 when 
the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 was signed into federal law. Within 
the act is a provision entitled “Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate 
Medical Resident Matching Programs” that codifies an antitrust law 
exemption to the Match.16 The provision, which is unrelated to the titled 
purpose of The Act, was undoubtedly a pork-barrel insertion resulting from 
heavy special interest lobbying on the behalf of defendant medical 
organizations and associated groups.17 The provision was never publicly 
debated before signing and, other than the text of the code itself, has never 
been justified or explained by Congress.18  
Though there have been a handful of news stories and journal articles 
published criticizing the Match since the Jung case, the federal 
government’s official endorsement of the Match’s antitrust exemption has 
practically ended all organized criticism of the system. After the dismissal 
of the Jung case at the district court level, the plaintiffs petitioned the 
Supreme Court for review but were denied.19 The Jung case might be over 
but medical residents continue to face an unreasonable restraint on their 
liberty.  
Part I of this paper will provide an overview of the medical education 
process. This information is vital to understand the harsh reality faced by 
both medical students and residents and will serve as a foundation for 
understanding the weight of their sacrifice of liberty. Part I will also provide 
a simplified introduction of the Match and discuss the emotional, 
psychological, and economical ramifications of the system. Part II details 
the Jung litigation, including the exact nature of the complaint and the 
ultimate passage of the antitrust exemption. In Part III the focus shifts to a 
philosophical exploration of classic ideas of liberty and explores how the 
 
 
15. Named defendants included the Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”), 
the National Resident Matching Program (“NRMP”), the American Medical Association (“AMA”), the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”), and numerous teaching hospitals 
such as Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, and Yale-New Haven Hospital. 
Complaint, Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. CIV.A.02–0873 
PLF).  
16. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, § 207, 118 Stat. 596 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 37b). 
17. Sarah L. Geiger, The Ailing Labor Rights of Medical Residents: Curable Ill or a Lost 
Cause?, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 523, 535 (2006). 
18. Madison, supra note 1, at 762–63. 
19. Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 549 U.S. 1156 (2007) (denying Plaintiff’s request for a 
writ of certiorari). 











Match contradicts theories of classical liberalism and economics. Part IV 
explores more specifically how antitrust exemptions interfere with liberty 
and threaten a free society. Finally, Part V proposes alternatives and 
modifications that could be implemented to improve the Match system.  
I. OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL MATCH AND RESIDENT LIFE 
Doctors are not made overnight. The process is long, arduous, and 
expensive. Aspiring physicians must first complete a four-year 
undergraduate degree and take all courses required for medical school 
admission (generally a minimum of one year of biology, two years of 
chemistry, and one year of English, though specific requirements vary based 
on the institution). 20 A showing of academic success is not enough to obtain 
admission to medical school; competitive applicants will have volunteer 
hours, physician shadowing experience, leadership positions, 
extracurricular activities, and a high score on the Medical College 
Admission Test (“MCAT”).21 Once admitted, the new medical student faces 
another four years of intensive education, fraught with more highly 
competitive battles.22  Early in the fourth year of medical school, students 
enroll in the National Residency Matching Program (“the Match”), which 
matches students to residency programs across the country.23   
A. The Match Process 
Upon graduation from medical school, all students must complete a 
medical residency program to become a licensed physician. Since 1952, a 
system affectionately known as “the Match” has controlled appointment to 
 
 
20. Admission Requirements, ASS’N AM. MED. COLLS., https://students-
residents.aamc.org/applying-medical-school/applying-medical-school-process/medical-school-
admission-requirements/admission-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/7ZB7-RHRC]. 
21. Id.  
22. For an eye-opening look into the human experience (and sometimes tragedy) of medical 
education, see David Muller, Kathryn, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1101, 1102 (2017):   
Every time students achieve what looks to the rest of us like a successful milestone—getting 
into a great college, the medical school of their choice, a residency in a competitive clinical 
specialty—it is to some of them the opening of another door to a haunted house, behind which 
lie demons, suffocating uncertainty, and unimaginable challenges. Students bravely meet these 
challenges head-on while we continue to blindly ratchet up our expectations. 
From their very first shadowing experience to their first foray in the lab; from high school 
advanced-placement courses and college admissions tests to grade point averages and the 
Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT); with helicopter parents, peer pressure, violins and 
varsity soccer, college rankings, medical school rankings, medical licensing exams, and the 
residency Match, we never let up on them—and it’s killing them. 
23. Intro to Main Residency Match, NAT’L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, 












these programs.24 The now computer-controlled algorithm was 
implemented to help alleviate the chaos and simplify the hiring process of 
the graduating medical students that enter the workforce each year.25  
Indeed, some kind of uniform system was needed; the resident job 
market prior to 1952 lacked organization and often resulted in less-than-
favorable employment outcomes.26 The demand for new doctors grew 
throughout the early 1900’s and hospitals scrambled to secure the most 
competitive medical students for their programs. To maintain an edge, 
hospitals were forced to begin choosing their future physicians earlier and 
earlier in the education process—often as early as the beginning of the 
student’s junior year of medical school.27 “This was regarded as costly and 
inefficient both by the hospitals, who had to appoint interns without 
knowing their final grades or class standings, and by the students . . . who 
found that much of the senior year was disrupted by the process . . . .”28 
Earlier hiring also meant that medical students were pressured into 
accepting offers before they were sufficiently informed of all of their 
employment options.29 By 1945, the problem had reached a peak30 and 
institutions decided to set and enforce a uniform date before which no 
appointments could take place.31 This strategy seemed helpful for a while, 
but within several years residency programs again began pressuring 
students to make hasty decisions by calling students directly and requiring 
them to either accept or reject an employment offer before the phone call 
ended.32 Finally, in 1952, with input from medical school deans and 
students, the Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”) 
formulated and implemented the first version of the centralized matching 
system still used today.33 
 
 
24. See Roth, Origins, supra note 5, at 909. 
25. Id.  
26. Id.  
27. Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A 
Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. POL. ECON. 991, 993 (1984) [hereinafter Evolution].  
28. Id. at 993. 
29. “The chief symptom that something was amiss in the early market for interns was that 
hospitals began to try to hire interns earlier than their competitors, so medical students often could only 
consider offers from one hospital at a time, without knowing their prospects at other hospitals.” Roth, 
Origins, supra note 5, at 909. 
30. In 1944, a program director wrote to the Association of American Medical Colleges 
expressing his concern that sophomore medical students were contacting him with employment 
enquiries- a full two years before their employment would even begin. Roth, Evolution, supra note 27, 
at 994.  
31. Roth, Origins, supra note 5, at 909. 
32. Id. at 910. Needless to say, students resented this practice; oftentimes, students would panic 
on the phone and accept the offer out of sheer nervousness. Id.  
33. Id. Over the years, the Match has been occasionally modified to reflect the improvements 
in technology and the changing demands in medicine. For example, today the Match is entirely 











The Match system is designed to take into account the preferences of 
both applicants and hiring institutions.34 In simple terms, applicants rank 
their preferred institutions, the institutions rank their preferred applicants, 
and the algorithm determines the highest common ranking match between 
the two.35 In theory, the Match will result in the pairing of the most 
appropriate applicant with the most appropriate institution. At noon on the 
third Friday in March, fourth year medical students will open a letter with 
trembling hands and learn not only where they will be working for the next 
four years, but also what specialty of medicine they will spend their life 
pursuing.36 About half of applicants will be placed in their top choice; the 
other half will inevitably experience some degree of disappointment.37 
The system succeeds at fulfilling its 1952 vision of streamlining the 
resident hiring process, but the costs that come with this success are high, 
even for those applicants that are fortunate enough to be placed in their first 
choice program. For all practical purposes, participation in the Match is 
mandatory for all domestic medical students who wish to become a licensed 
physician in the United States.38 Once enrolled in the program, participants 
are explicitly barred from agreeing on any employment terms during the 
interview and ranking process.39 Participants are forbidden from even 
asking one another about how they plan to rank their choices.40 One critic 
notes, “the mere registration of a medical student into the NRMP matching 
process inevitably invokes unequal bargaining and negotiating power with 
respect to the terms, conditions, and nature of the resident's anticipated . . . 
program and hospital employment.”41 Furthermore, both applicants and 
 
 
computerized. Also, the modern Match allows for couples that seek to be matched in the same 
geographic area to be ranked together. Id. at 911. 
34. Id. at 910. 
35. Id. The algorithm does not penalize students for ranking institutions they are unlikely to 
be matched with (i.e. students should rank according to their actual preference, not according to how 
they think institutions will rank them). Id. at 911.  
36. Match Week & SOAP for Applicants, NAT’L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, 
http://www.nrmp.org/match-week-soap-applicants/ [https://perma.cc/KZ54-S8U6].  
37. Brendan Murphy, If You’re Feeling Disappointed on Match Day, You Are Not Alone, AM. 
MED. ASS’N (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/residents-students/match/if-you-re-feeling-
disappointed-match-day-you-are-not-alone [https://perma.cc/3APU-SE32]. “If something feels off or 
feels wrong, it’s really common, a lot of unexpected things can happen and no one really has control 
over the algorithm,” said AMA Member Laura Halpin, MD. “The disappointment is a real challenge 
because most people find out about their match in a formal ceremony and the room is full of people 
screaming with excitement.  It’s easy to feel you failed or did something wrong if you don’t get your top 
choice.” Id. 
38. Frances H. Miller & Thomas L. Greaney, The National Resident Matching Program and 
Antitrust Law, 289 JAMA 913, 914 (2003).  
39. Id.  
40. See infra quote accompanying note 44.   












hiring institutions are irrevocably bound to whatever match the algorithm 
produces.42  
Once a match is made, there is no flexibility—neither the hiring program 
nor the applicant can release the other from the match commitment.43 
Violations are reported to the applicant’s medical school and the state 
medical boards and can result in the applicant’s expulsion from medical 
school or a three-year (sometimes permanent) ban from participating in the 
Match.44 Additionally, after successfully matching, applicants are not 
allowed to discuss or enter into any employment contract outside of the 
Match with their matched institution or any other institution.45 
In summary, to become a physician in the United States, students must 
complete a residency program after graduation from medical school. To 
complete a residency program, students must enroll in the Match. Enrolling 
in the Match bars the student from engaging in any negotiation with 
prospective employers. Students are contractually bound to whatever match 
the algorithm produces. That means the student must begin their matched 
residency program, even if that program is their last choice, not in their 
preferred specialty, or across the country from where they would like to be 
 
 
42. Miller, supra note 38, at 914.  
43. Wilkey, supra note 11, at 716 (“Once a medical student accepts a match, the student is 
contractually obligated to the terms of the program contract, including a start date.”).  
44. Gregory Dolin, Time to Enter a “Do Not Resuscitate” Order on the National Resident 
Matching Program’s Chart, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 59, 66–67 (2004) (“Given the fact that 
participation in the Match is almost obligatory if one is serious about securing a residency, a bar on the 
participation can potentially bar an individual from becoming a licensed physician for up to three 
years.”). Furthermore, “violations” has a broad meaning: 
Under the NRMP rules, not only are the programs and applicants forbidden from signing a 
contract prior to the Match, but they are also forbidden from enticing each other into ranking 
them higher on the rank order list. The programs and applicants are forbidden from even asking 
one another about how they plan to rank each other. Thus, an applicant is essentially prevented 
from bargaining with the program for employment conditions prior to the release of the Match 
results.  
Id. 
45. Miller, supra note 38, at 914. Not matching into a program at all is rare, but it happens 
about 5% of the time. Murphy, supra note 37. For these students, the next step is to enter into the 
Supplemental Offer and Acceptance Program (“SOAP” also colloquially, “the scramble”). Id. Students 
enrolled in SOAP apply for and are offered positions that remain unfilled after the Match. Id. Even then, 
some students are unsuccessful at finding a job through the SOAP process as well. These students are 
not allowed to care for patients and have no choice but to sit out a year, strengthen their application with 
additional degrees, clinical observerships, or research positions (often unpaid), and then reapply for the 
Match the following year. Timothy M. Smith, What If You Don’t Match? 3 Things You Should Do, AM. 
MED. ASS’N (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/residents-students/match/what-if-you-don-t-
match–3-things-you-should-do [https://perma.cc/YSJ6-6GP4]. Students in this position are expected to 
begin repaying their student loans unless they are eligible for deferment or forbearance. If You Don’t 
Match: Steps to Manage Student Loans, ASS’N AM. MED. COLLS., https://students-
residents.aamc.org/applying-residency/article/if-you-dont-match-steps-manage-student-loans/ 
[https://perma.cc/WG4J-2RLH].  











located. A waiver will be granted only on very rare occasions if the match 
would cause “serious and extreme hardship” to the student.46 
B. Realities of Residency and Why Bargaining Matters 
Once the thrill and excitement of the Match is over, first-year doctors 
must face the reality of their new positions. For the vast majority of these 
new doctors, medical residency will involve extremely long hours and low 
wages.47  
The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education 
(“ACGME”) limits residents to working eighty hours per week (averaged 
over four weeks).48 In addition, the ACGME caps shift lengths at twenty-
four hours, with up to four additional hours allowed for patient care 
transition and resident education.49 On average, these twenty-eight hour 
work “days” are required about four times a month.50 These standards seem 
brutal enough, but to make it worse, almost half of all residents report 
working more than allowed by the ACGME and falsifying duty hour 
reports.51  
The inevitable sleep deprivation resulting from such long work hours has 
a significant impact on the health of residents and the medical outcomes of 
their patients.52 Studies have shown that being awake for eighteen to twenty 
 
 
46. See Wilkey, supra note 11, at 716 n.61.  
47. See, e.g., Ryan Park, Why So Many Young Doctors Work Such Awful Hours, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/doctors-long-hours-
schedules/516639/ [https://perma.cc/A4ZB-F9E4]. Many residents also struggle with mental health 
issues—28.8% of medical residents will struggle with depression or depressive symptoms, a rate nearly 
five times higher than the general population. Douglas A. Mata, Marco A. Ramos, Narinder Bansal, 
Rida Khan, Constance Guille, Emanuele Di Angelantonio & Srijan Sen, Prevalence of Depression and 
Depressive Symptoms Among Resident Physicians, 314 JAMA 2373, 2381 (2015).   
48. ACGME Common Program Requirements (Residency), 2018 ACCREDITATION COUNCIL 
FOR GRADUATE MED. ED. 45, 
https://www.acgme.org/Portals/0/PFAssets/ProgramRequirements/CPRResidency2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/892Z-HPPH]. 
49. Id. at 48–49.  
50. Park, supra note 47.  
51. Brian C. Drolet, Matthew Schwede, Kenneth D. Bishop & Staci A. Fischer, Compliance 
and Falsification of Duty Hours: Reports from Residents and Program Directors, J. GRADUATE MED. 
ED. 368, 371 (2013). Furthermore, a 2006 study found:  
[83.6%] of interns reported work hours in violation of the standards during 1 or more months. 
Working shifts greater than 30 consecutive hours was reported by 67.4% . . . Averaged over 4 
weeks, 43.0% . . . reported working more than 80 hours weekly, and 43.7% . . . reported not 
having 1 day in 7 off work duties.  
Christopher P. Landrigan, Laura K. Barger, Brian E. Cade, Najib T. Ayas & Charles A. Czeisler, Interns’ 
Compliance with Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education Work-Hour Limits, 296 JAMA 
1063, 1063 (2006).  
52. See, e.g., Lindsay Kalter, Residents are Sleep Deprived. So What’s New?, ASS’N AM. MED. 












hours leads to a “cognitive and motor skill impairment equivalent to being 
drunk.”53 Despite this, shifts often require residents to be awake and making 
critical patient care decisions for even longer.54 A 2006 study exploring the 
relationship between extended shifts and adverse patient outcomes found 
that “serious medical errors” occurred 36% more frequently when residents 
worked extended shifts.55 
Residents are not particularly well compensated for their efforts, either. 
In 2019, the median salary for a first year resident was $56, 912.56 Adjusted 
for inflation, this figure has remained substantially unchanged for five 
decades, and is actually decreased from the median salary in 1972.57 
Compensation varies little between geographic regions; residents in the 
Northeast are paid about the same as residents in the Midwest, despite 
having generally higher costs of living.58 Similarly, virtually all institutions 
pay residents the same starting salary, regardless of their specialty.59 Thus, 
hypothetically, a surgery resident working an average of eighty or more 
hours per week60 will earn the same salary as a family medicine resident 
who works a more “normal” fifty to sixty hours per week.   
In a traditional labor market, work hours and wages can be negotiated. 
But, the Match, attempting to “[create] order out of the chaos of a free labor 
market also contributes to industry norms of punishing hours and low pay, 
by restricting competition among employers that could result in better 
wages and working conditions.”61 The strict requirements of the Match 
essentially prevent bargaining.  
 
 
new [https://perma.cc/7ZB7-RHRC]. Sleep deprivation leads to depression, social isolation, and weight 
gain. Id. 
53. Id. See also Barger, supra note 13 (“[T]he adverse effects after 24 h of continuous 
wakefulness on neurobehavioral performance are comparable to that of a blood alcohol concentration of 
0.10%.”).  
54. Barger, supra note 13. 
55. Id. (reporting that studies showed the scheduling of 24 hour or greater work shifts poses 
significant increased safety hazards to patients, contributes to preventable fatal and nonfatal adverse 
events, and interferes with resident education).  
56. ASS’N AM. MED. COLLS., SURVEY OF RESIDENT/FELLOW STIPENDS AND BENEFITS 
REPORT 5 (2019), https://www.aamc.org/system/files/2019–
11/Survey%20of%20Resident%20Fellow%20Stipends%20and%20Benefits%20Report%202019–
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRA5-FSTE]. 
57. The mean inflation-adjusted salary was $8,070 in 1972 compared to $7,749 in 2019. Id. at 
7.  
58. Weighted mean salary for first year residents in 2019 was $61,549 in the Northeast, 
compared to $56,987 in the Midwest. Id. at 9.  
59. 98.7% of responding institutions reported that salaries are the same across all specialties. 
Id. at 15.  
60. Interestingly, surgical residents are the most likely to falsify their duty-hour reports 
(62.1%). Drolet, supra note 51, at 370 fig.1.  
61. Park, supra note 47.  











The implication of the match's restrictions and the participants' 
behavior is that there is little foundation for negotiation with 
individual candidates. . . . [A]pplicants do not have the extra leverage 
that they would have in a conventional labor market characterized by 
unfettered, individualized competition among both future employers 
and future employees.62 
The Match creates a binding agreement between the resident and the 
employing institution.63 Furthermore, residents cannot hold multiple offers 
that could otherwise be used as leverage for better hours or wages.64  
II. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE MATCH  
There is very little case law concerning issues related to medical resident 
employment.65 When such cases have been heard, generally “courts have 
not necessarily furthered or enhanced the employment rights of medical 
residents, rather courts have adversely affected, limited, and potentially 
hindered such rights.”66 Although courts have occasionally been required to 
consider cases related to resident discrimination, termination, and 
unemployment compensation,67 there is only one notable case, Jung v. 
Association of American Medical Colleges,68 that challenged the Match 
process itself.  
A. The Jung Case and Resulting Antitrust Exemption 
In 2002, three resident physicians filed a complaint on behalf of all 
resident physicians under the federal antitrust laws against the Association 
of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”), the National Resident Matching 
Program (“NRMP”), the American Medical Association (“AMA”), the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”), and a 
number of other medical organizations and individually named teaching 
hospitals.69 Plaintiffs alleged: 
 
 
62. Madison, supra note 1, at 775–76. 
63. See supra text accompanying note 42.  
64. Dolin, supra note 44, at 71 (“[A] given applicant does not know how many programs are 
actually willing to extend an offer to him, therefore, he is in no position to leverage his marketability.”). 
65. Wilkey, supra note 11, at 731. 
66. Id.  
67. See Wilkey, supra note 11, at 731–43 (summarizing case law concerning medical resident 
employment issues).  
68. 300 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2004). 
69. Complaint, Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 












Defendants and others . . . illegally contracted, combined, and 
conspired among themselves to displace competition in the 
recruitment, hiring, employment and compensation of resident 
physicians, and [imposed] a scheme of restraints which have the 
purpose and effect of fixing, artificially depressing, standardizing, 
and stabilizing resident physician compensation and other terms of 
employment.70 
Plaintiffs argued that Defendants restrained competition by stabilizing 
wages below competitive levels, placing residents in programs only through 
the Match process, and establishing anticompetitive accreditation 
standards.71 According to the Plaintiffs, these practices caused significant 
harm to resident physicians by artificially establishing wages far below what 
would result under normal market conditions.72  
In their complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that the Match replaces a free 
market system with a “centralized, anticompetitive allocation system [that 
assigns] prospective resident physicians . . . to a single, specific and 
mandatory residency position.”73 This centralized system acts as a substitute 
to (and, in fact, prohibits) any external employment negotiations that could 
allow applicants to bargain for increased wages or more desirable working 
conditions.74 The Plaintiffs further contend that the problem is made worse 
because the ACGME, the organization responsible for granting institutions 
with accreditation, has the authority to regulate the number of residency 
positions offered by institutions, thereby placing an external limitation on 
the resident job market.75  
In light of the analysis of Part I of this paper, the Plaintiffs’ claims that 
there is a “collusion” of sorts between the reigning medical agencies to 
suppress wages does not seem farfetched. Residents provide hospitals with 
high-skilled, cheap labor. “[Residents] are paid a fixed, modest salary that, 
on an hourly basis, is on par with that paid to hospital cleaning staff—and 
even, on an absolute basis, about half of what nurse practitioners typically 
earn, while working more than twice as many hours.”76 In an academic 
hospital, patients receive the majority of their care from medical residents.77 
 
 
70. Id. ¶ 2. 
71. Id. ¶ 3. 
72. Id. ¶ 72.  
73. Id. ¶ 83. 
74. Id. ¶ 86, a-c. 
75. Complaint ¶ 88, a-d. 
76. Park, supra note 47. 
77. Geiger, supra note 17, at 523 (“Patients of academic hospitals receive most of their direct 
care from medical interns, residents, and fellows who are one, two, three, or more years out of medical 











This labor is valued at approximately $1.6 billion dollars annually, yet 
hospitals get it for far less.78 
In February of 2004, the court issued an order addressing certain 
defendants’ motions to dismiss for various reasons but allowed the suit to 
proceed for several of the defendants.79 However, shortly thereafter, on 
April 10, 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law the Pension 
Funding Equity Act of 2004, which contains a provision entitled 
“Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical Resident Matching 
Programs.”80 This provision, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 37b states that:  
It shall not be unlawful under the antitrust laws to sponsor, conduct, 
or participate in a graduate medical education residency matching 
program . . . . Evidence of any of the conduct described in the 
preceding sentence shall not be admissible in Federal court to support 
any claim or action alleging a violation of the antitrust laws.81 
This official confirmation of the antitrust status of the Match resulted in a 
swift end to the Jung case. In August of 2004, the district court granted the 
remaining defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed 
the case.82 All subsequent attempts by the plaintiffs to appeal the decision 
were denied.83 
B. Congressional Justification of the Exemption 
Neither the House nor the Senate held public debates about the 
exemption prior to the bill being signed into law.84 One critic writes, “The 
legislation thus formed a prime example of pork barrel legislation tacked 
onto a bill which was intended to update interest rates for the purposes of 
reducing employer contributions to pension funds. As the bill went into 
 
 
school. . . . [R]esidents are offered virtually no labor law protection by virtue of their position as 
employees of hospitals.”). 
78. Wilkey, supra note 11, at 713. Replacing a surgical resident with another physician would 
cost a hospital approximately $215,000 to $315,000. See infra quote accompanying note 89. 
79. 300 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 
80. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–218, § 207, 118 Stat. 596 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 37b). 
81. 15 U.S.C. § 37b(b)(2).  
82. 339 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
83. See Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 184 F. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 
S. Ct. 1041 (2007). 
84. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 1, at 762–63 (“Congress made no attempt to resolve this 
question publicly when in 2004 it created an antitrust exemption for the residency match. . . . [The Act] 
passed both the House and Senate with no mention of any residency-related antitrust exemption. It was 












conference meetings, the [anti-trust status] rider did not exist.”85 Several 
senators had strong responses to the covert addition of the exemption 
provision.86 Wisconsin Senator Herb Kohl was particularly worried (and 
rightly so) that the exemption would cut short the Jung litigation:  
The exemption will end many of the claims in an ongoing lawsuit 
brought by a number of medical students and residents that has 
already survived efforts to have it dismissed. The students contend 
that through the matching program, the hospitals depress wages and 
cause residents to work inordinately long hours to the detriment of 
patient care. This exemption appears to eliminate all of the students’ 
claims with the exception of their allegation of price fixing.  
. . . . 
In general it is bad policy to provide exemptions to the antitrust laws. 
It is certainly unusual to enact an exemption that ends part or all of 
an ongoing lawsuit. We should have had the opportunity to debate 
this issue and determine whether there was any merit to the 
exemption, rather than see the exemption mysteriously appear on an 
unrelated bill. It appears that this provision, enacted in this way, is 
nothing more than a giveaway to one particular special interest.87 
New Mexico Senator Jeff Bingaman joined the criticism and was 
additionally concerned with the effect the exemption would have on the 
constitutional rights of medical residents:  
Section 207 of the conference report creates an antitrust exemption 
for the graduate medical residency program that currently assigns 
medical students to hospitals where they are required to work for 60 
to 100 hours per week for an average of $9 or $10 an hour. To people 
who are not familiar with the way this place functions in recent years, 
they would be surprised to find that we have written into the pension 
bill a retroactive exemption from the antitrust laws related to this 
issue of medical residency programs. . . . 
[T]he antitrust exemption that is established by subsection (b)(2) 
raises grave constitutional concerns. There has been no justification 
 
 
85. Geiger, supra note 17, at 535.  
86. 150 CONG. REC. S3981 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (“For the 
managers of this bill to insert a controversial provision with no Senate debate or discussion is the worst 
way to legislate, particularly in the complicated area of antitrust law.”). 
87. 150 CONG. REC. S3979 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004). 











presented to this Congress, to any committee of this Congress for 
depriving medical residents of the same protections under the 
antitrust laws that are enjoyed by other workers and other Americans. 
I do not see how it is constitutionally permissible to take away the 
equal protection and the due process rights of medical residents 
without any showing that is necessary or beneficial.88 
The sly signing of the exemption into law was undeniably due to intense 
lobbying efforts by the AMA and AAMC, both named defendants in the 
Jung lawsuit, who had a strong interest in preventing the litigation from 
proceeding: 
Coincidentally, the AAMC, named as one of the defendants in the 
Jung suit, stepped up its lobbying efforts after Jung filed suit and 
expressed uncompromising support for the above 
amendment. Allowing the unraveling of the match would greatly 
diminish the AAMC's power over post-graduate medical training         
. . . . Offering more labor rights to medical residents would cost 
academic hospitals inordinate amounts of money. The cost of 
replacing one surgical resident with a “physician extender,” or other 
physician, is $210,000 to $315,000 a year.89 
 
 
88. 150 CONG. REC. S3991–92 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004). Senator Bingaman’s statement also 
included the transcript of a letter he and Senators Craig, Feingold, and Kohl sent to the Majority Leader 
expressing their concerns. The body of the letter will also be reproduced here, as it is highly relevant to 
the issues explored in this note: 
GENTLEMAN: We are writing to express our concern about legislative proposals that have 
the potential to undermine ongoing antitrust litigation against the National Resident Match 
Program (known as the ‘‘Match’’) by granting the ‘‘Match’’ a retroactive antitrust exemption.  
It is our view that Congress should subject proposals like this one that hold widespread 
implications for patient safety and the working conditions of hundreds of thousands of medical 
residents to the regular legislative process—including hearings and consideration in the 
appropriate committees—before allowing it to move through Congress. This is particularly 
important considering that such proposals would retroactively interfere with pending litigation, 
in which the factual record has not yet been developed and the court has not yet ruled on the 
merits of the claims. In addition, it is important for the Committee to consider the specific 
language of any such proposal, as legislation intending to exempt the Match could have 
broader, unintended effects, including effectively immunizing price-fixing and other 
anticompetitive practices alleged in the litigation.  
By permitting such a bill to go forward without full consideration of all the factual and legal 
issues, we would set a precedent that will encourage defendants in all types of pending litigation 
to come to Congress for relief.  
Id. at S3992. 












Congress has never clearly articulated the justification for the exemption in 
the sixteen years since its passage.90 The only semblance of an explanation 
is found in the text of § 37b itself, which touts the effectiveness of the Match 
in streamlining the hiring process and credits it with producing “the finest 
physicians and medical researchers in the world.”91 Notably, Congress also 
claims in § 37b that the process is “pro-competitive.”92 In saying this, “it 
seems that Congress made an independent finding that the match does not 
violate the Sherman laws, but it [provides] no data to support this finding.”93 
C. The Medical Labor Market Monopsony  
As discussed in Part I of this paper, the centralized Match system 
replaced an open market hiring process for first year medical residents in 
the 1950s.94 In the years since, economist Alvin E. Roth has made 
significant contributions and improvements to the matching algorithm.95 
Roth attributed the chaos of the pre-Match hiring process to an “unraveling” 
of the medical labor market that forced both students and employers to seek 
out employment contracts earlier and earlier in the medical education 
process before either side had enough information to make the best 
 
 
90. “It is unclear whether Congress’ main motivation for its passage was a perceived effect on 
medical education or another reason.” Id. 
91. 15 U.S.C. § 37b.  
92. Id. 
93. Geiger, supra note 17, at 538. 
94. See George L. Priest, Timing “Disturbances” in Labor Market Contracting: Roth's 
Findings and the Effects of Labor Market Monopsony, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 447, 449 (2010). 
95. Id. Roth was heavily involved with developing the modern match algorithm:  
[Roth’s] concept of optimal match consists of an optimal ordinal match of preferences as 
between workers and firms. An ordinal match is one in which a worker is matched with its first-
choice employer where that worker was the first choice of the employer; subsequently, second 
choices are matched with second choices (because their respective first choices were otherwise 
matched with first-choice matches), and so on. Given this formulation of the model, it is 
obvious why Roth and the Roth tradition so strongly advocate the introduction of a centralized 
matching mechanism, such as the medical residency match, since ordinal matching is exactly 
what that mechanism can accomplish. 
Id. Roth has also developed matching systems for various other markets, including UK medical resident 
hiring, undergraduate sorority/fraternity recruitment, and has argued for the adoption of a similar 
matching program for appellate judicial clerks. Id. 











decision.96 Roth argued that hiring decisions made outside of the official 
Match process would always carry the risk of suboptimal placement.97  
In a 2010 paper, economist and antitrust expert, George L. Priest, 
critiqued Roth’s logic.98 Though Priest praised the ingenuity of the Match 
algorithm, he argued that Roth failed to consider the underlying cause of the 
“early contracting market phenomena.”99 Priest pondered the reason why 
the medical resident market unraveled, but other, similar markets, such as 
the hiring process of other graduating professionals, did not seem to suffer 
from the same pre-emptive hiring issues.100 The reason seems obvious once 
Priest points it out. The labor market for first year medical residents is 
different because wages are not a driving force.101 Through collusion, like 
that alleged in the Jung case, or some other kind of agreement, hospitals 
have set an artificial wage depression on medical residents, effectively 
creating an employment monopsony—a single entity controlling an entire 
labor market.102  
 
 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 26–33. “The Roth tradition has analyzed this early 
contracting as a form of market failure: as the ‘unraveling’ of the market as employers (e.g., hospitals) 
and employees (e.g., medical students) enter employment contracts at increasingly early times, prior to 
the possibility of either to perfectly determine optimal employment decisions.” Priest, supra note 94, at 
448.  
97. Priest, supra note 94, at 449 (“Roth views such activities as deficient because any 
agreement reached outside the operation of the centralized matching mechanism introduces, according 
to the model, a risk of suboptimality.”). 
98. Id.  
99. Id. at 450.  
100. Priest offers a very enlightening comparison between the hiring of first year residents and 
the hiring of first year attorneys. He points out that medical and law students are similar in that some 
students will be more competitive academically, and thus the prestige of entry-level jobs will vary 
greatly amongst members of the same graduating class. He reasons, then, that the range of entry-level 
salaries should be similar. However, this is not the case: 
For medical school graduates in the Northeast section of the country, resident salaries differed 
between the 75th percentile and 25th percentile by $3,471. In contrast, for law school graduates, 
first-year attorney salaries in New York differed between the 75th and 25th percentiles by 
$77,500, over 22 times as much . . . . Note also the absolute differences in starting salaries. In 
New York in 2001, a 75th percentile law graduate earned $125,000; a 75th percentile medical 
resident, $39,401; in California, a 75th percentile law graduate earned $125,000; a 75th 
percentile medical resident, $35,220. 
How can these differences be explained? Are medical residents more homogeneous in talent 
than law school graduates to explain the much more narrow range of medical than law graduate 
salaries? And more homogeneous by 20–30 times? Can the comparative absolute salary levels 
be explained? A legal education requires 3 years of generalized study prior to taking a full-time 
law job; a medical education, four years of study prior to residency. Is there an economic reason 
that a 75th percentile law graduate in California with 3 years of graduate education should earn 
a starting salary 3.55 times that of an equivalent medical resident in California with 4 years of 
graduate education?  
Id. at 464.  
101. Id. at 450.  
102. Id. A monopsony is “[a] market situation in which one buyer controls the market . . . . 












Furthermore, Priest contends that the Match program, though 
intelligently designed, only serves to strengthen the monopsony that created 
the problem in the first place.103 Priest cites two reasons for this. First, the 
lack of price as a driving force eliminates any need for hospitals and 
residency programs to bargain for more competitive applicants with higher 
wages or better working conditions.104 
Secondly, the Match weakens the medical labor market by removing the 
ability for hospitals to show the intensity of preferences by offering a higher 
wage.105 A “more sensitive placement according to intensity of preference” 
is replaced by an “ordinal ranking.”106 Match participants are able to rank 
their preferences but a simple ordinal ranking system oversimplifies the 
reality of the situation.  
For instance, in a hospital’s ranking of prospective candidates, employee 
choice one ranks higher than choice two, but what if choice two ranks much, 
much higher than choice three? What if choice two ranks so much higher 
than choice three that the hospital is willing to substantially increase the 
salary offer? The system does not, and cannot, account for this level of fine-
tuning. If choice three creates what the algorithm views as “the best match,” 
it will award the hospital with choice three- even if the hospital would have 
been more than willing to pay a premium price for choice two. 107  
Priest contends that the only way to truly solve the medical resident labor 
market crisis is to eliminate the monopsony conditions “and [allow] price to 
serve as the market clearing mechanism.”108  Removing extraneous forces 
on the market is consistent with the ideas of classical liberalism. 
 
 
monopsonist is a buyer with no rivals.’” Monopsony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(quoting LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED 
HANDBOOK 137–38 (2000).).  
[W]hat Roth and his colleagues have viewed as “timing problems” represents the working out 
of competitive market forces in the context of external market constrictions . . . with respect to 
labor markets, the problems of transaction timing identified by Roth and his colleagues are 
responses to market monopsony. 
Priest, supra note 94, at 451. This also explains the discrepancy between salary ranges of graduating 
medical students and law students as discussed supra note 99. The average salary range of graduating 
law students varies appropriately among students because the legal market, though competitive, is not 
subject to a monopsony.  
103. Priest, supra note 94, at 451 (“[T]he central effect of matching programs of this nature is 
to shore up and buttress these employer monopsonies, an effect that cannot generally be defended on 
social welfare grounds.”).  
104. Id. at 466–67.  (“In an open market, hospitals at a disadvantage in terms of the provision 
of nonwage benefits could remain competitive by offering higher wage compensation. The hospital 
oligopsony, sustained by the matching program, eliminates this possibility.”). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (“In other markets, price is a means of allowing intensity of preference to guide 
purchase and sale decisions.”). 
108. Priest, supra note 94, at 450.  











III. THE VALUE OF LIBERTY 
Before delving into any kind of liberalistic analysis of the Match’s 
antitrust exemption, it is vital to first define “liberalism” and differentiate 
classical liberalism from the modern, partisan definition of liberalism. 
“Liberalism,” as used in this paper, refers to the classical liberalism of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Classical liberalism was closely tied to 
classical economic theory, which advocated "the obvious and simple system 
of natural liberty and opposed unjustified or excessive governmental 
intervention into economic affairs.”109 Classical liberal thinkers generally 
have an optimistic outlook on human nature and value individual happiness, 
equality, and, above all, personal liberty in all aspects of life.110 Lewis E. 
Hill contrasts classical liberalism with the modern shift to what he refers to 
as “welfare liberalism.”111 If classical liberalism is the removal of unnatural 
restraints, welfare liberalism is the positive addition of beneficial 
alternatives.112  
Importantly, one aspect of liberalism that has remained unchanged is 
“the belief that individuals should be left free to decide their own values and 
shape their own lives.”113 This freedom extends to business associations and 
economical choices. Henry Simons, an early member of the Chicago school 
of economics, wrote, “[a] free society must be organized largely through 
voluntary associations. Freedom to associate or to dissociate, to belong or 
not to belong, especially in economic activities”.114 This is a stark contrast 
to the more pessimistic, traditional conservative approach which views 
individuals as being incapable of knowing what is best for themselves, thus 




109. Lewis E. Hill, On Laissez-Faire Capitalism and ‘Liberalism’, 23 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 
393, 394 (1964) (internal quotation omitted).  
110. Edward O. Correia, Antitrust and Liberalism, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 99, 107–08 (1995); 
see also Hill, supra note 109, at 394 (“Liberty was thought to be the natural state of affairs which 
required no positive action. It was believed to be necessary only to remove the unnatural restraints from 
man in order to insure that liberty would naturally result.”); HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR 
A FREE SOCIETY 3 (1948) (“Liberalism is an optimistic view of man and society.”).  
111. Hill, supra note 109, at 394. Hill cautions that welfare liberalism should not be confused 
with Marxian socialism, which is not consistent with welfare liberalism’s objective of freedom. Id. at 
394 n.7. 
112. Id. at 394. Hill explains that the shift from classical liberalism to welfare liberalism was 
due to both economic and political reasons, including the advancement of technology, political 
democracy, and the increased presence of morality in politics. Id. at 395. 
113. Correia, supra note 110, at 111. 
114. SIMONS, supra note 110, at 3.  












A. Classical Liberalism and the Roles of the State 
John Stuart Mill, one of the most influential thinkers of classical 
liberalism, defined social liberty as “the nature and limits of power which 
can be exercised by society over the individual.”116 Mill urged that society 
must only exercise power over the individual if such power is necessary to 
prevent harm to others.117 “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign.”118 An individual of mature mind and faculties, 
therefore, cannot be made to do something simply because it is what society 
deems is “best” or “right” for him. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in 
the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These 
are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, 
or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or 
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.119 
An individual must “be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions 
into practice at his own cost.”120 This kind of freedom—one that allows 
individuals to make their own choices based on their own knowledge of 
themselves—does not hinder society, but improves it.121 One who allows 
the flow of society to decide his path is merely mimicking others before 
him, but the individual “who chooses his plan for himself . . . must use 
observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather 
materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, 
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision.”122 Even the 
brightest thinkers and innovators when “forced into one of these moulds” 
become useless to society.123 
The Match forces all American doctors into what is essentially an 
assembly-line production that bears a frightening similarity to the useless 
 
 
116. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 73 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. 
Press 2003) (1859). In this work, Mills emphasizes the importance of individuality and the freedom of 
thought, discussion, and self-expression.  
117. Id. at 80.  
118. Id. at 81. “In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, 
absolute.” Id.  
119. Id. at 80.  
120. Id. at 121. 
121. Id. at 83. “Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to 
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.” Id. 
122. Id. at 124.  
123. Id. at 129.  











“moulds” Mill warns about. According to Mill, individualism fosters 
innovation; likewise, placing limitations on and forcing individuals into 
societal “norms” hinders innovation. “Genius can only breathe freely in an 
atmosphere of freedom.”124 This logic is no less true for medical 
professionals. It is a disservice to the advancement of the medical arts to 
take some of the brightest minds in our society and send them through a 
one-size-fits-all processing plant125 for the sake of streamlining a system 
that is inevitably, and necessarily, complicated. In trying to simplify the 
system, it seems Congress failed to consider that perhaps the system should 
not be simple in the first place—perhaps the system should be left to the 
design of market alone.  
B. Natural Liberty 
Adam Smith, known as “The Father of Economics,” believed an ideal 
society would be guided by a system of “natural liberty.”126 Natural liberty 
is the level of free choice that exists when all external restraint systems are 
stripped away. “Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, 
is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring 
both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, 
or order of men.”127 Individuals, so long as their actions do not break the 
law or harm others, should be left free to pursue whatever path they choose.  
An additional benefit of natural liberty is that it frees the State from any 
responsibility of the impossible task of “superintending the industry of 
private people.”128 The State is left, then, with only three duties:  
[F]irst, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and 




125. In describing the Match process, I cannot help but visualize it as the production of overly 
processed American cheese slices. American cheese is usually cheddar cheese that is broken down, 
sterilized, reconstituted into a square mold, cut, and packaged into identical, individual slices. Popular 
brands of American cheese products are so heavily modified and processed that they can no longer be 
legally labeled as “cheese,” but must be labeled as “pasteurized prepared cheese product.” See, e.g., 
Stephanie Strom, A Cheese ‘Product’ Gains Kids’ Nutrition Seal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015), 
https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/a-cheese-product-wins-kids-nutrition-seal/. I do not think it 
is necessary to emphasize that physicians are very different from cheese products. Yet I find that a 
shocking comparison can be made. The bright, eager minds of future physicians are broken down by the 
realities of medical education, programmed to function in an increasingly homogenous environment, 
and then reconstituted via the Match which places all doctors into practically identical employment 
“packages.” 
126. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
444 (Jonathan B Wight ed., Harriman House Ltd. 2007) (1776). 
127. Id. 












protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the 
injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of 
establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty 
of erecting and maintaining certain public works, and certain public 
institutions . . . .129 
Outside of those duties, Smith and other natural liberty idealists believe that 
the State should refrain from interfering with the day-to-day dealings of 
individuals, especially dealings involving employment. Smith viewed the 
value of labor as “the original foundation of all other property, so it is the 
most sacred and inviolable.”130 To interfere with this property right would 
prevent an individual “from employing this strength and dexterity in what 
manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor” and would 
constitute “a plain violation of this most sacred property.”131 The Match, a 
tightly regulated and obligatory system, seems exactly like the kind of 
“external system” that Smith would argue should be stripped away.  
IV. THE DANGERS OF ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS TO LIBERTY 
One of the main goals of federal antitrust laws is to protect competition, 
which is considered beneficial to the public.132  Competition is necessary 
for “real freedom of association—and [for] real power dispersion. All 
monopolies, and all very large organizations of sellers (or buyers), are 
impairment of that freedom.”133 Antitrust exemptions are essentially legal 
monopolies and directly conflict with this purpose of protecting 
competition. Thus, exemptions have been enacted sparingly.134 Historically, 
the majority of statutory exemptions have been enacted in response to 
temporal pressures and special interest lobbying.135 “Many scholars believe 




130. Id. at 80.   
131. Id.   
132. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 1. 
133. SIMONS, supra note 110, at 4. 
134. Id. 
135. See text accompanying infra notes 139–41. See also Anne McGinnis, Ridding the Law of 
Outdated Statutory Exemptions to Antitrust Law: A Proposal for Reform, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 529 
(2014).  
Today, the antitrust community largely views statutory exemptions as special interest 
legislation that is harmful both to the legitimacy of the government's regulation of the economy 
and to economic progress. Many exemptions have aroused this sentiment since the time of their 
passage. However, supporters of each statutory exemption were able to proffer at least some 
public policy reasons for each exemption's necessity. 
Id. at 540.  











are often special interest legislation, passed at the behest of a particular 
industry without full consideration of the larger social or economic 
impact.”136 Henry Simons warned “private monopolies with the blessing of 
regulation and the support of law are malignant cancers in the system.”137 
When faced with competition, monopolies seek government regulation and 
antitrust exemptions to maintain control.138 Critics of antitrust exemptions 
have rightly pointed out that government implementation of exemptions is 
disjointed, inconsistent, and often in response to passing or temporal 
pressures. 139 “Some of these exemptions are partial, others complete. Some 
apply to particular industries or organizations, others immunize specific 
activities and practices. Some were originally installed in periods of 
depression, others in periods of war or defense mobilization. Some are de 
jure, others de facto.”140 Monopolists, disguising their motives as the 
promotion of a public purpose, have been able to use their political influence 
to persuade the government to grant them a special commercial 
advantage.141 
Simons cites this hodgepodge method of government interference as one 
of the main reasons for ridding the economy of private monopolies. Every 
legal monopoly inevitably requires government intervention through 
regulation.142 Government regulation begins a cycle that ultimately leads to 
even more government regulation.143 “[E]very interference by government 
on behalf of one group necessitates . . . additional interference on behalf of 
others.”144 The accumulation of government interference and regulation 
creates an “enterprise economy paralyzed by political control.”145  
V. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES 
It is not the author’s belief that the Match should be disposed of 
completely. It has served a positive function in the medical education 
system for over 60 years. The legislature’s concern that without the Match 
there would be chaos and increased burdens on medical students is not 
 
 
136. McGinnis, supra note 135, at 544. 
137. SIMONS, supra note 110, at 86. 
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139. Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The Political Economy of Antitrust Exemptions, 29 
WASHBURN L.J. 215, 216 (1990).  
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unfounded. Clearly, before implementation of the Match, students were 
facing unnecessary pressure to make premature decisions. However, the 
manner in which the Match is currently implemented allows for abuse of 
the system by employers and medical regulating agencies. 
Especially worrisome is how the antitrust exemption the Match enjoys 
is actually codified and explicitly supported by the legislature, leaving no 
room for argument in the judiciary branch regardless of how valid the case 
may be. Henry Simons wrote, “The only good power is that of law based on 
overwhelming voluntary consensus of free men and built and rebuilt by 
gradual experimentation, organized discussion, and tolerant 
compromise.”146 By that definition, the Match’s antitrust exemption is not 
“good power.” The codification of the Match’s antitrust exemption was 
implemented suddenly in response to a lawsuit seen to the powers-that-be 
as inconvenient. There was no “gradual building and rebuilding” or 
“experimentation.” There was never any public discussion prior to signing 
the bill into law. The Jung plaintiffs attempted to have an “organized 
discussion” but were almost immediately shut down.  
Instinctually, the author feels that medical residents need the ability to 
freely contract with their prospective employers in the way any other 
professional is able to freely contract. The Match puts a constraint on 
residents that would be unacceptable to nearly every other professional 
field. While it is interesting to entertain the thought of removing all 
monopsony conditions and letting price control the market, as proffered by 
Priest,147 it is clear that, realistically, a total reorganization or disposal of the 
system may not be feasible or even desirable. Instead, the author adopts a 
similar view to that of Robert Wilkey who advocated for substantial reform 
in his 2011 Creighton Law Review article.148 
First, the employment status classification of medical residents needs to 
undergo a transformation. Medical residents continue to suffer from the 
misconception that they are not “employees,” but rather “physicians in 
training.”149 “[F]or medical residents to ever have equal standing with other 
professions, it is important that they be designated, classified, and afforded 
the status of employees.”150 Although medical residents are “employees” 
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for tax purposes,151 this luxury has not been extended to the labor rights 
context.152 The ACGME has made an official statement clarifying their 
position that medical residents are students rather than employees.153 This 
misclassification seriously hinders the ability of medical residents to 
recover under labor law statutes, which typically only apply to “employees.” 
Despite the educational aspect of their training, medical residents make up 
a large percentage of many hospitals’ workforce and certainly function in 
the capacity one might expect of an “employee.”154 For medical residents to 
be afforded full protection under the law, it is absolutely vital that the 
controlling medical agencies begin referring to them as employees.155  
Second, medical residents need to be provided with a copy of their 
prospective employment contracts before entering into any binding 
agreements. “[A]lthough the National Resident Matching Program 
("NRMP") purports to require that GME programs provide applicants an 
advance copy of the appointment contract, there is no assurance by the 
NRMP that the appointment contract is made available, accessible, or 
contains accurate information.”156 Because the Match is a legally binding 
program as soon as an individual enrolls, this effectively means that 
residents enter into a contract without ever being given the opportunity to 
review the terms. In any other scenario, this would be unconscionable. 
Giving residents the ability to fully know and understand the contract they 
are about to enter would be a start to restoring the balance of bargaining 
power. As it is, one party is all-knowing and all-controlling, and the other 
party is left in the dark, bound to whatever contract the system matches her 
with.   
Third, Wilkey argues that there must be implementation of uniform 
grievance policies and procedures.157 The ACGME is the accrediting 
agency for medical residencies. Therefore, it is fully within the agency’s 
power to implement and enforce policies by stripping a program of their 
accreditation.158 Although Wilkey focuses his discussion on how such 
procedures could protect residents from problems involving non-renewal or 
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non-promotion,159 a uniform grievance procedure could also aid in the 
enforcement of duty hour restrictions, which as discussed in Part I, are often 
not followed.160 For such a highly regulated system as the Match, an equally 
regulated and enforced grievance system does not seem out of bounds.  
Finally, there is one last thing that must be addressed—the artificial 
depression of wages.161 There is no hard evidence of collusion among 
hospitals and medical organizations, but all signs indicate there must be 
something going on beneath the surface that has caused homogenous 
salaries across all specialties and geographic regions.162 It is the author’s 
firm belief that the Jung plaintiffs were justified in their allegation of 
collusion. It is unfortunate the case was cut short and the public can no 
longer benefit from any information that may have been uncovered during 
discovery and litigation. For this problem, there is no easy solution. Until 
there is either a total redesign of the Match system, drastic legislative or 
judicial action, or collective action by medical residents, residents will 
continue to be woefully undercompensated and overworked.  
CONCLUSION 
In almost every respect, the healthcare system is complex, frustrating, 
and imperfect. These maladies extend to the hiring process of medical 
residents. Often, graduating medical students are young adults facing their 
first foray into the working world. They may have never once been expected 
to negotiate any kind of legally binding contract but will soon be thrust into 
a world where they will be expected to gracefully handle actual life-or-
death decisions on a daily basis. These new doctors will make critical 
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decisions about the lives of other people yet, ironically, are not afforded the 
same level of discretion in deciding their own employment future.  
This is not to say that the Match is a failure or that it always produces 
undesirable results. In fact, placement statistics show that the majority of 
residents will be placed into their first choice program.163 Furthermore, these 
programs, whether they were the resident’s first choice or not, do succeed 
at producing some of the highest quality physicians in the world.164 The 
Match undoubtedly helps to streamline this production process.165  
However, looking only at statistics to judge the success of the Match 
overlooks the humanistic element of medical residency. The statistical 
success of the Match does not answer questions like: How many new 
physicians are actually happy with their residency positions? What kind of 
changes could be implemented to increase resident happiness and decrease 
burnout? Are residents able to maintain healthy social relationships outside 
of work? Do the residents have enough time to sleep? Eat? Engage in 
exercise? The answers to these questions have far-reaching effects.166 The 
Match may succeed at streamlining an “inefficient, chaotic, and unfair”167 
process, but at what cost? The public relies on physicians to take care of its 
individuals, but these physicians must also receive proper care. This care 
must start in the medical education process by supporting the natural liberty 
of medical residents and allowing them to bargain for and enter into 
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